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ARISTOTLE ON CONSCIOUSNESS
Phil Corkum, UCLA
Presented to the SAGP at the January, 2005 meeting with the
American Philological Association, in Boston
Aristotle sometimes draws analogies between perceiving and thinking. One analogy, for 
example, concerns the relation holding between faculties and their objects. If thinking is 
like perceiving, then as the faculty of perception is to the object perceived, so too the 
faculty of thought is to the intelligible object.1 Of course, there are also disanalogies 
between perception and thought. For example, where perception requires external 
stimulation by sensible substances, thought does not generally require external 
stimulation. How far then might we push the analogy?
In this essay, I’ll argue that the role of the agent intellect in thought is analogous 
to the role of perceiving that we see and hear in perception.
The paper comes in two parts. In the first part, I’ll rehearse an argument for the 
conclusion that perceiving that we see and hear isn’t the office of a faculty separate from 
the special senses of seeing and hearing: rather, perceiving that we see and hear is a kind 
of turning of one’s attention to the affection of the sense organs.
In the second part of the essay, I’ll address the question, what light do these 
results in the case of perception shed on the agency of the agent intellect? Let me unpack 
this issue just a little. Aristotle holds that there is a passive intellect, by which the mind 
can become any intelligible object, and an active or agent intellect, by which the mind can 
make any intelligible object. Drawing the analogy with perceiving that we see and hear, 
I’ll argue that the agent intellect isn’t a faculty separate from the passive intellect. Rather, 
it’s a kind of turning of one’s attention to the intelligible objects contained in the passive 
intellect. The activity of the agent intellect is, for Aristotle, a kind of consciousness. The 
argument from an analogy between perception and thought thus provides support for a 
line of interpretation of the De Anima that. I’ll note, goes back to at least Franz Brentano.
Finally, let me flag here that the picture of Aristotle’s account of consciousness 
that emerges from the argument of this paper suggests comparison between Aristotle and 
a contemporary view of consciousness as a higher-order representation. I’ll later urge for 
caution in making this comparison.
I
In De An. 3.2 (425b 12-25), Aristotle considers what we might call higher-order 
perception—perceiving that we perceive.
(a) Inasmuch as we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight or by 
some other sense that the percipient perceives that he sees.
2(b.l) But, it may be urged, the same sense that perceives sight will also perceive 
the color that is the object of sight. So that either there will be two senses to 
perceive the same thing or the one sense, sight, will perceive itself, (b.2) Further, 
if the sense perceiving sight were really a distinct sense, either the series would go 
on to infinity or some one of the series of senses would perceive itself. Therefore 
it will be better to admit this of the first in the series.
(c) Here, however, there is a difficulty. Assuming that to perceive by sight is to 
see and that it is color or that which possesses color which is seen, it may be 
argued that, if you are to see that which sees, that which in the first instance sees, 
the primary visual organ, will actually have color.
(d. 1) Clearly, then, to perceive by sight does not always mean one and the same 
thing. For, even when we do not see, it is nevertheless by sight that we discern 
both darkness and light, though not in the same manner, (d.2) Further, that which 
sees is in a manner colored. For the sense organ is in every case receptive of the 
sensible object without its matter. And this is why the sensations and images 
remain in the sense organs even when the sensible objects are withdrawn.2
Here’s an outline of this passage. In (a), Aristotle raises a question for an account of 
perceiving that we see: is this higher-order perception the office of sight or another 
faculty? In (b. 1 ) and (b.2), he gives two arguments against the latter claim. In (c), he 
raises a problem for the former claim; and in (d.l) and (d.2), he offers two solutions to 
this problem. The conclusion is that perceiving that we see is the office of sight.
There are a lot of difficulties for interpreting this passage,3 but I want to focus on 
one of the two arguments given against the claim that the perception that we see is the 
office of a faculty distinct from sight. The argument of (b.l) rests on the assumption that 
whatever faculty perceives a special sense must also perceive the object of that sense: in 
the case of sight, color. This grounds an argument against there being a separate sense for 
second-order perceptions since it violates the thesis, advanced in De An. 3.1, that for any 
type of sense object—such as color—there’s at most one sense.4
At first blush, this argument isn’t persuasive. For there seems to be no reason to 
hold the assumption on which it rests. Suppose that our bodies were so wired that 
whenever we see, we emitted a low humming sound. Then we could hear that we see 
without of course hearing colors.5 A faculty of higher order perception could operate 
analogously—although not, of course, by means of one of the special senses such as 
hearing. That is, even if we concede that the cognitive activity in question is a kind of 
perception, there is still no reason to think it is the office of the same perceptual faculty as 
the faculty whose activity is being perceived.6,7
Let me make a proposal. The difficulties which we have found in this argument 
rest on the mistaken assumption that Aristotle’s claim is that perceiving that we see and 
hear is a special case of perception—as though, in addition to cases of normal perception
3such as seeing and hearing, we sometimes cognize that we are seeing and hearing; and 
Aristotle is making the implausible claim that such cognition is also a kind of perception.
I’ll suggest an alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s claim. Perceiving that we 
see and hear is not a special case of perception but is rather a necessary condition for any 
ordinary perception whatsoever. In what follows, I’ll argue that this interpretation offers 
several advantages over the special-case interpretation: it makes better sense of both the 
place of the argument of our passage, 425b 12-25, within the line of argument from 2.12 
to the end of 3.2, and the details of the arguments within the passage as well.
Notice that if Aristotle’s claim was that perceiving that we see and hear is a 
special case of perception, then the first half of 3.2 (425bl2-26a26) would be
nothing more than an aside without relation to the discussions that precede or follow it.
On the other hand, taking Aristotle’s claim to be that perceiving that we see and hear is a 
necessary condition for perception fits this section within a continuous line of argument 
from 2.12 to the end of 3.2. The argument prior to 2.12 presents a partial account of 
perception as a continuous affection linking sense object with sense organ by means of a 
sense medium ( m e t a x u : literally, a continuity).8 What the colored object excites is neither 
the sensitive faculty nor the sense object directly but is rather the medium of sight, the 
transparent. It is this, the continuous transparent, which, excited by the sense object, in 
turn excites the sense organ. So sight takes place through an affection of the sensitive 
faculty not by the color itself but by a medium.
De An. 2.12 then raises the question, why does the media of perception not itself 
perceive? The media would perceive if being affected in a certain way were a sufficient 
condition for perception. For both the media and the sense organ are excited or affected in 
similar ways. The question, posed at 424b 16-17, is: “What then is smelling, besides a sort 
of suffering or being acted upon?” I take it that this question is not rhetorical. That is, 
Aristotle’s claim is not that smelling is just a sort of suffering or being acting upon. 
Rather, the preceding discussion has shown that being affected in a certain way is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for perception. The question now at hand is: what 
else is required to provide a sufficient condition for perception?
By 425b 12, Aristotle has concluded that the component of perception, in addition 
to a certain kind of affection, is perceiving that we see and hear. The argument of 425b 12- 
25 does not defend this thesis but addresses a question that subsequently arises: is such 
perception the office of a special faculty? Before turning to this question, what more can 
be said of perceiving that we see and hear beyond the claim that such activity is a 
necessary condition for perception?
Aryeh Kosman argues that perceiving that we see and hear is, in Aristotle, what 
Kosman calls ‘apperceptive awareness’. He (1969, 508) writes that “to perceive ... is not 
simply to be affected but to perceive that one is And he continues that
perception is thus “affection of which the living organism is .” I find this
suggestion attractive, but in speaking of consciousness, we need to proceed carefully.
If perceiving that we see and hear is a kind of consciousness, then it resembles the 
contemporary view of consciousness as a higher-order perception.9 Under this view, 
phenomenally conscious experience requires the subject’s awareness of a state; and such
4awareness consists in the subject representing that state itself. Aristotle’s use of indirect 
discourse, the ‘that’-clause, suggests that he views perceiving that we see and hear as an 
awareness of a representation of the subject’s own state. But here’s one reason why such 
comparisons between Aristotle and contemporary views could mislead. Such views are 
typically put to the end of providing a reductive analysis of the subjective nature of 
experience—an explanation of what it’s like to perceive.10 Aristotle’s aim is rather to 
distinguish a mode of life, one special kind of motion, from the physiological changes 
found in the sense organs and media.
I hold that perceiving that we see and hear is, simply, a turning of one’s attention 
to the affection of the sense organs. What I mean by attention here is a prosaic and 
common phenomenon. We can, for example, attend to some item in our visual field while 
ignoring other items; when we suddenly notice what was previously unnoticed, it often 
comes as something of a surprise. Compare suddenly noticing background noise. Our 
sense organs are certainly affected by all items in our visual or aural fields. But if we do 
not attend to an item, we do not, properly speaking, perceive it—in some fairly chunky 
but not uncommon sense of ‘perceive’.11 This is, I suggest, Aristotle’s intended notion 
when he speaks of perceiving that we see and hear.
Taking Aristotle’s claim in this way also makes the arguments within 425M2-25 
intelligible.13 Recall that the difficulty canvassed in (b.l) rests on the assumption that 
whatever faculty perceives a special sense must also perceive the object of that sense. On 
the interpretation that perceiving that we see and hear is a special case of perception, this 
assumption is implausible, as I argued above. However, if perceiving that we see and hear 
is a kind of awareness of, or turning of one’s attention towards, the affection of the sense 
organ caused, through the medium, by the sense object, then the assumption is plausible. 
For such attention might plausibly be called both a perception of the seeing, say, and a 
perception of the object so seen.14
So here’s the story so far. I’ve argued that viewing the perception that we see and 
hear as both a necessary condition of perception and as a kind of attention or 
consciousness makes better sense both of the place of the argument of 425b 12-25 within 
the line of argument from 2.12 to the middle of 3.2 and of the details of the arguments 
within 425M2-15. The claim that such attention is not the office of some faculty other 
than the faculties of the special senses follows immediately.15
II
I turn to Aristotle’s account of the agent intellect in De An. 3.5. As I said in the 
introduction to this essay, I will be concerned in this section of the essay with the 
question, is the role of the agent intellect in intellection analogous to the role of 
perceiving that we see and hear in perception? The analogy suggests all of the following: 
that the activity of the agent intellect is not a special case of intellection but rather a 
necessary condition for any intellection; that this activity is not the office of a faculty 
separate from the potential intellect; and that it is a kind of turning of one’s attention to
5the meta or intelligible objects possessed by the potential intellect. I find these theses
attractive for the simplicity and elegance with which they account for what little textual 
data De An. 3.5 and 3.8 gives us. Moreover, they portray Aristotle as giving a reasonable, 
if sketchy, account of concept acquisition and employment. But they are controversial 
claims. The agent intellect is generally taken to be a faculty separate from the potential 
intellect.16 So we need to go carefully through this material.
Aristotle apparently introduces a distinction between the so-called potential 
intellect and the so-called agent or active intellect at De An. 3.5 (430al0-17):
But since, as in the whole of nature, to something which serves as matter for each 
kind (and this is potentially all the members of the kind) there corresponds 
something else which is the cause or agent because it makes them all, the two 
being related to one another as art to its material, of necessity these differences 
must be found also in the soul. And to the one intellect, which answers to this 
description because it becomes all things, corresponds the other because it makes 
all things, like a sort of definite quality such as light. For in a manner light, too, 
converts colors which aire potential into actual colors.
There is a danger of misinterpretation here which is analogous with the misinterpretation 
I warned the reader against in the first section of this essay. There, recall, the 
misinterpretation was that of viewing perceiving that we see and hear as a special case of 
perception instead of a necessary condition for perception. Here, one might view the 
activity of the agent intellect as a special case of intellection. The view would be spelt out 
as follows. When in the presence of a particular substance, our intellects may enter into 
formal identity with the intelligible form which makes that substance the sort of thing it 
is: it is in this sense, according to this view, that our minds can become all things—or 
rather, can become all intelligible forms. But, the view would continue, in addition to this 
cognitive ability, our intellects have the capacity to enter into formal identity with 
intelligible forms even in the absence of a particular substance instantiating that form: it 
is in this sense that our minds can make all things.
Before expounding an interpretation of the agent intellect, I’ll note one more 
challenge for any view that the so-called potential and agent intellects are different 
faculties. I’ve argued that the discussion of the so-called passive and agent intellects 
describes a passage from the first potentiality to the first actuality of intellection: 
describing, that is to say, both the agent’s acquisition of a capacity to entertain a certain 
kind of object of cognition and his execution of just this capacity. It is, then, a single kind 
of object of cognition that is the object of both the so-called passive and agent intellects. 
This causes a problem for any interpretation that claims that the passive and agent 
intellects are different faculties. Aristotle seems to hold the thesis that to each kind of 
object of cognition there corresponds one and only one faculty.17 If Aristotle does indeed 
hold this thesis, then this establishes a condition of adequacy for any interpretation of 
Aristotle’s view of intellection: the interpretation must be consistent with this thesis. The 
interpretation of the agent intellect which I am advocating meets this condition, as will 
become clearer in just a minute.18
6The picture just sketched fails to meet this condition. The distinction of the 
intellect becoming all things and making all things is not describing two different 
activities both of which are thinking but is rather describing two different kinds of 
activities only one of which is actually thinking. In particular, I hold that Aristotle’s 
discussion of the intellect becoming all things concerns a passage from the first 
potentiality to the first actuality of intellection; the discussion of the intellect making all 
things concerns the passage from the second potentiality to the second actuality of 
intellection. This will suggest that the relation holding between the agent and the passive 
intellect is analogous to the relation holding between the perception that we perceive and 
the special senses.
Explicating this distinction among potentiality and actualities will require a brief 
excursus into Aristotle’s discussion, in De An. 2.5, of the question, why there is no 
sensation of the senses themselves? That is, why do they produce no sensation ( )
apart from external sensible objects? The answer is that the external stimulation of the 
sense organs is a necessary condition for perception or, more precisely, the passage from 
the first actuality of perception, the aisthetikon, to the second actuality of perception, 
aisthanesthai.
Aristotle has a tripartite division of stages of actualization. One may have the 
potential to acquire a capacity; this is first potentiality. One may, having actualized this 
potential, possess a capacity; this is first actuality (also called second potentiality19). One 
may exercise this capacity; this is second actuality. Aristotle’s favorite illustration of 
these distinctions is the acquisition, possession and exercise of knowledge. For example, 
a child is bom with the first potentiality to learn a language; in passing from first 
potentiality to first actuality, the child, being instructed, acquires the linguistic skills 
required to be a competent speaker of that language; in passing from first actuality to 
second actuality, the competent speaker employs these skills—she speaks (or understands 
the speech of another). The first passage, from first potentiality to first actuality, is a kind 
of alteration ( alois)and, in the case of the acquisition of knowledge, requires external
causation in the form of instruction.
The second passage, from first actuality to second actuality, is not an alteration 
and, in the case of the exercise of knowledge, does not require external stimulation. It is 
tempting to say that the passage from first actuality to second actuality, in the case of 
perception, also does not require external stimulation but this is a disanalogy with the 
case of knowledge. Although the passage from first actuality to second actuality does not 
generally require external stimulation, in the case of perception this is required. I take it 
that this is part of the argumentative purpose of 2.5: external stimulation of the sense 
organs is a necessary condition of perception despite it being a passage from first 
actuality to second actuality.
With this set-up in the background, I’ll now argue that the description of the 
intellect becoming all things in De An. 3.4 describes the passage from first potentiality to 
first actuality. Thus this, the actuality of the so-called potential intellect, is a necessary 
precondition for thinking but is also an insufficient condition for thinking. Then I will 
argue that the description of the intellect as making all things in De An. 3.5 describes the 
passage from first to second actuality.
7De An. 3.4 (429al8-24) opens with a description of the first potentiality of 
intellect as a kind of nothingness:
The mind ... since it thinks all things, must needs, in the words of Anaxagoras, be 
unmixed with any, if it is to rule, that is, to know. For by intruding its own form it 
hinders and obstructs that which is alien to it; hence it has no other nature than 
this, that it is a capacity. Thus, then, the part of the soul which we call intellect...
ΛΛ
is nothing at all actually before it thinks. [Italics mine]
The notion of capacity employed here is capacity in the sense of first potentiality; and the 
notion of thinking here is the second potentiality or first actuality of the intellect. This is 
made clearer later in the chapter, as Aristotle proceeds, at 429b5-9, to describe the result 
of this thinking:
when the intellect has thus become everything in the sense in which one who 
actually is a scholar is said to be so (which happens so soon as he can exercise his 
power of himself), even then it is still in one sense but a capacity: not, however, a 
capacity in the same sense as before it learned or discovered.
The intellect that thinks is nonetheless a capacity; and reference is made to Aristotle’s 
example of second potentiality as the possession of knowledge. Clearly, Aristotle is 
describing a passage from first potentiality to second potentiality.
I turn to the passage from the second potentiality to the second actuality of 
intellect. Now, on the view that the activity of the agent intellect is a special case of 
intellection, the discussion of the agent intellect in 3.5 is an aside without relation to what 
precedes it. Viewing the activity of the agent intellect as a necessary condition for 
thinking places the discussion in 3.5 within a continuous line of argument. I have noted 
that De An. 3.4 describes an intellect that becomes all things. The question arises, once 
the intellect has become all things, why does the intellect not always think all things?
That is to say, the sense in which the intellect becomes all things describes a necessary 
but insufficient condition for thinking: if the account in 3.4 were describing a sufficient 
condition for thinking, then the intellect which becomes all things would think always all 
things. There must be another component to thinking: this is the contribution made by the 
agent intellect.
I’ve argued that the agency of the agent intellect is a necessary condition for the 
second actuality of intellection.211 turn now to the question: What does the agent intellect 
do? The analogies with perceiving that we see and hear, which I’ve already established, 
are suggestive. Is the agency of the agent intellect a kind of attention or consciousness?22 
On this picture, the thinker acquires the capacity to entertain a particular object of thought 
through the process of concept acquisition described in De An. 3.4. However, to possess 
object of thought in this manner is not to be continuously thinking. Just as we may have 
sensible forms in our visual field, which we do not perceive until we attend to them, so 
too we have intelligible forms in our intellects of which we do not always think. Actual
8thinking happens when the thinker turns his attention to one of the intelligible forms 
within his conceptual resources.
Let me bring the paper to a close. I’ve advocated an interpretation of the active 
intellect as a kind of attention or consciousness.24 The interpretation has several virtues. 
First, it maintains an analogy between perception and thought (provided the interpretation 
of perceiving that we see and hear canvassed in the first section is correct). Second, it’s 
adequate to Aristotle’s thesis that to each kind of object of cognition there corresponds 
one and only one faculty: the interpretation thus avoids the difficulties which face any 
view positing distinct faculties for the potential and active intellects.25
1 This analogy is suggested by De An. 3.4 (429al3-18).
2 All translations of De An. are from Hicks (1907) except where noted.
3 There are difficulties with each stage of the argument. Consider first section (a). What 
cognitive activity is being described as perceiving that one sees or hears? And why is this 
form of cognition called perception? Unlike the other modes of perception, the object of 
such cognition is not a sensible object, an aistheton, but an activity, an aisthanesthai.
This raises a problem for the following reason. The objects of perception are not 
generally truth bearers. Truth and falsity for Aristotle imply the combination and 
separation of what Aristotle, conflating propositional constituents and their expressions in 
language, calls names and verbs. In De Interpretatione 1 (16al3-15), Aristotle gives the 
example of a sensible quality, expressed by “white”, which is neither true nor false. 
Aristotle sometimes speaks more loosely of perceptions being true. For example, at De 
An. 3.3, Aristotle claims that perceptions of the special senses (ton idiori) are true or least 
subject to error. However, the sense in which perceptions are true is not that they imply 
combination and separation but that one cannot be in error that he is, say, seeing red. But 
the expression, “perceive that (hoti)I see and hear,” used at 425b 12, suggests that the 
objects of such perception are truth bearers: they are the combination of a name and a 
verb. If cognitions of sensible objects are non-veridical but cognitions of acts of 
perceiving are veridical, then the grouping together of both kinds of cognition under the 
label, “perception,” seems strained.
The arguments in support of the claim that we perceive that we see by means of sight are 
no more lucid. The stated problem is that, since the object of sight is color, if we perceive 
that we see by means of sight, then what we perceive in this higher-order perception, the 
sense organ, will be colored. However, the problem rests on the seemingly false 
assumption that we can perceive that we see only if we perceive that which sees, the 
sense organ. Let us for the moment accept this assumption. I speculate that the difficulty, 
which Aristotle is briefly canvassing here, is that the color of the eye doesn’t appear to be 
dependent on the color of what is seen: pace Crystal Gayle, nothing seems to turn your 
brown eyes blue. If the assumption that we can perceive that we see only if we perceive
9the sense organ is true, then this apparent indifference of the cornea to the sense object is 
indeed problematic.
What counterarguments does Aristotle offer? The response of (d.l) is that perception by 
sight is not one thing. The difficulty with interpreting this argument is to understand its 
relevance to the problem of (c). Hamlyn (1968, 122) also questions the relevance of this 
move, writing that “perception by sight might be multifarious, as he indicates by the case 
of judging darkness and light, but not necessarily in the right respect.” That it is by sight 
that we perceive darkness and light may show that perception by sight is not one thing. 
But it is fallacious to infer from this that it is by sight that we perceive that we At 
best, (d.l) opens the possibility of giving an argument for this conclusion. Section (d.2) 
gives just this argument. Despite appearances, the color of the sense organ in a manner 
dependent on the color of what is seen. I will not enter into the well-worn controversy 
regarding in what manner the sense organ takes on the color of the sense object—i.e., 
whether there is a physiological change in the organ. Of course, the sense organ proper is 
not the eye but the jelly inside the eye. So the fact that the cornea doesn’t change color 
with what is seen does not refute the claim. This explanation of these arguments makes 
some sense of (c)-(d), but only under the seemingly false assumption that we can perceive 
that we see only if we perceive that which sees, the sense organ. So we have yet to clarify 
any section of the passage.
4 Hamlyn (1968, 121) seems to fail to notice this, writing only that “the possibility that 
we know that we see by means of a different sense ... would mean that the object of sight, 
color, would be an object of this sense too, which goes against the whole notion of an 
object of sense.”
51 owe this example to L.A. Kosman (1969), who uses it to illustrate a somewhat 
different point.
6 Hamlyn (1968, 122) rightly criticizes this assumption but, I believe, for the wrong 
reason. He writes that “one can be aware that one is seeing without being aware of what 
one is seeing.” Perhaps Hamlyn is thinking of such a case as viewing something in the 
distance and not knowing what object, a man or a scarecrow, say, it is that one is seeing. 
However, it is not the office of sight to judge that the color seen is the attribute of a man 
and not the attribute of a scarecrow. On the other hand, if Hamlyn is claiming that one 
can be aware that one is seeing a color without being aware of what color one is seeing, 
then Hamlyn is mistaken.
7 The argument of (b.2) seems just as weak. The danger of an infinite regress depends 
upon the assumption that in order for a distinct sense to perceive any perception of order 
n by means of an (n+l)-order perception, there must be a further sense to perceive the 
(n+l)-order perception by means of an (n+2)-order perception. So for a distinct sense to 
perceive a special sense such as sight, there must be a further sense to perceive the 
second-order perception with a third-order perception, and so on. But this assumption 
seems clearly false. Why could a distinct sense not perceive a special sense such as sight 
without there being the further need for a perception of this second-order perception?
10
8 Notice, it is not just the distal senses that require a medium: at 2.11, Aristotle argues 
that flesh is the medium, not the organ, of touch.
9 See, for example, Rosenthal 1993 and Carruthers 2000.
10 For the modem locus classicus for the subjective nature of experience, see Nagel 1974.
11 One might hold that we can perceive an item unawares. The distinction I am drawing 
here between perceiving awares and perceiving unawares is similar {modulo the 
comments below on misreading Aristotle as advocating the contemporary notion of 
consciousness) to that drawn—for example, by Block (1995) and Tye (1995)—between 
perceptual consciousness with access-consciousness and perceptual consciousness 
without access-consciousness. Such perception would, of course, provide no basis for our 
beliefs or actions.
Contemporary higher-order theorists of consciousness draw on similar examples of 
nonconscious perceptual states. See Armstrong 1968 for the case of absent-minded 
driving; and Carruthers 1996 for the case of blindsight.
12 Kosman (1969) does not put the point in the way I have but, if I am reading him right, 
he would agree with two major claims made in this section of the essay: first, that 
perceiving that we see and hear is not a special case of perception but is rather a necessary 
condition for any perception; and second, that such perception is not the office of a 
special faculty. It is not clear to me whether Kosman would agree or disagree with my 
further claim that perceiving that we see and hear is not a manifestation of a 
contemporary notion of consciousness.
1 ’ The parts of the passage I labeled (a) and (c) are also clearer. First, recall that if 
Aristotle’s claim were that perceiving that we see and hear is a special kind of perception, 
it would be entirely unclear why Aristotle would describe such cognition as a kind of 
perception at all: for the object of such awareness would not be a sensible object, an 
aistheton. but an activity, an aisthanesthai. The awkwardness of this terminology 
dissipates if we view perceiving that we see and hear as a necessary condition for 
perception. And not only is it now natural to call this kind of cognition “perception,” but 
to do so does not commit us to the thesis that the objects of such perception are truth 
bearers. Recall, the problem here is that the expression, “perceive that (hoti) I see and 
hear,” used at 425b 12, perhaps suggests that the objects of such perception are truth 
bearers. But if perceiving that we see and hear is simply a turning of one’s attention to the 
affection of the sense organs, then no combination of propositional components is 
entailed by the activity. Moreover, Aristotle sometimes uses expressions that do not 
employ ‘that’-clauses. At 425M5-16, for example, he calls this kind of cognition a 
perceiving of sight {he tes opseos aisthesis).
Finally, recall that the problem canvassed at (c) rests on the assumption that perceiving 
that we see and hear requires that we perceive the relevant sense organ. If perceiving that 
we see and hear were a special case of perception, there would be no reason to hold this 
assumption. However, suppose instead that perceiving that we see and hear is a kind of
11
turning of one’s attention towards the affection of the sense organ by the relevant 
medium. Then such perception is, in some sense, a perception of the organ.
This concludes my argument that the interpretation of perceiving that we see and hear as 
a kind of attention provides a better reading of 425M2-25. Notice, for making sense of 
(b.l) and (c), we require the intermediately strong interpretation of perceiving that we see 
and hear as a kind of attention: the weaker claim that perceiving that we see and hear is a 
necessary condition for perception would not be enough to render the respective 
assumptions plausible; and, on the other hand, the richer interpretation of perceiving that 
we see and hear as a kind of awareness is not required to make these assumptions 
plausible
14 Next, notice that the argument of (b.2) is now not only intelligible but compelling. Our 
problem in understanding this passage lay in the assumption that a distinct sense could 
not perceive a special sense such as sight without there being a need for a further 
perception of this second-order perception. This assumption generated an infinite regress. 
For a distinct sense to perceive sight, there must be a further sense to perceive the second- 
order perception with a third-order perception, and so on. If perceiving that we see and 
hear were a special case of perception, there would be no reason to hold the assumption. 
But the assumption is plausible when we realize that perceiving that we see and hear is a 
necessary condition for any perception. Then if perceiving sight were not the office of the 
faculty of sight itself, there would be a further need to posit a third-order perception of the 
second order perception.
151 will now sketch an account of common sense. For I have endorsed a reading of 
An. 3.2 on which perceiving that we see and hear is not the office of a special faculty, and 
one might hold instead that it is the office of the common sense. The alternative is that 
the common sense is the faculty of perceiving that the objects of the special senses are the 
properties of the same substance and of perceiving the common attributes ( ) such as
magnitude and motion. Cf. De An. 3.3. The faculty of the common sense discriminates 
between two special sensations such as white and sweet. I take it that the argumentative 
purpose of this second half of 3.2 is just this: the common sense is not a faculty of 
perceiving that we see and hear, despite some initial plausibility for this thesis. This, then, 
is the reason why a discussion of common sense is coupled with a discussion of 
perceiving that we see and hear: not because of their similarity of cognitive role but 
because of their dissimilarity of cognitive role.
16 Indeed, the medieval debates on Aristotelian psychology presuppose that the agent and 
potential intellects are separate faculties: the debate might be briefly characterized as 
identifying the distinguishing mark between the two faculties: whether the relevant 
distinction is that between materiality and immateriality, humanity and divinity, or 
substantiality and nonsubstantiality.
17 See De An. 3.1 (425al 1-13): “and thus, unless there exists some unknown body or 
some property different from any possessed by any of the bodies within our experience, 
there can be no sixth sense which we lack.” There are reasons, however, to hesitate in
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ascribing this thesis to Aristotle: the passage makes a claim about a state, an aisthesis, not 
a faculty, an aisthetikorv, moreover, the claim made in the passage may only apply to 
objects of perception.
181 do not claim that a two-faculty view of intellection cannot meet this condition but, 
given the prima facie difficulty, the burden of proof is clearly on the advocate of the
view.
19 412a 10 suggests calling this stage first actuality since it is the actualization of first 
potential; 417a21ff. suggests calling this stage second potentiality since second actuality 
is its actualization.
201 won’t enter into the controversy of interpreting the hindrance argument given here.
21 I’ll provide negative support for this claim by noting that a passage that may seem to 
refute my claim does not do so. Hicks’ translation misleadingly contributes to the 
appearance of the as being between two faculties. Hicks translates: “and to the one 
intellect {ho men toioutos nous), which answers to this description because it becomes all 
things, corresponds the other {ho de) because it makes all things.” However, instead of 
taking toioutos as adjectively modifying nous, we might just as naturally take it as a 
substantive. Then the passage reads: there is some aspect by which intellect becomes all 
things and another aspect by which (the one and the same) intellect makes all things.
Since the Greek supports either reading, this passage fails to provide evidence against the 
claim that the so-called agent intellect is not a separate faculty.
In his commentary on this passage, Hicks (1906, 500) notes the possibility of two 
readings and their significance for the interpretation of the distinction. However, Hicks 
analyses the possibilities, both philological and philosophical, somewhat differently than 
as I have in the body of the essay. Hicks takes toioutos to be predicative and standing for 
both “passive” with ho men and “active” with ho de. He here translates the passage as: 
"the one intellect is passive, like matter, in that it becomes all objects, the other intellect 
is active, like the efficient cause, in that it makes all objects.” (I’ll ignore the unhappy 
translation of panta as “all objects”.) Hicks continues: “If toioutos were attribute and not 
predicate, estin must mean ‘there exists’ and the sense must be ‘passive intellect exists in 
so far as it becomes all objects, active intellect, in so far as it makes all objects.’ Those 
who press this interpretation deny that A[ristotle] ever really taught the existence of two 
distinct intellects in the senses in which the art which constructs is distinct from the 
material which it works upon: they content that A[ristotle]’s one intellect is sometimes 
passive, sometimes active, as it is sometimes theoretikos, sometimes I have
offered a somewhat different reading of the Greek and a different claim about the unity of 
the intellect. In particular, I claim neither that the distinction is temporal nor that it is 
related to the distinction of theoretical and practical reasoning.
221 don’t claim any originality for this thesis. For antecedents, see Brentano (1867: 322) 
and Kosman (1992: 355). Neither do I claim, however, that Brentano or Kosman would 
agree with the line of argumentation of the paper.
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Although there is perhaps little textual support for this interpretation, neither is there 
any evidence against the view—a claim that I will now make plausible. I have argued that 
the agency of the agent intellect is analogous to the agency of the perceiving that we see 
and hear. If this claim is true, then one might expect Aristotle to draw this analogy 
explicitly: the activity of the agent intellect is to intellection as perceiving that we see and 
hear is to perception. What seems, at first blush, to be the strongest evidence against this 
claim is that, given the opportunity to draw an analogy with the agent intellect, Aristotle 
does not mention perceiving that we see and hear. On the contrary, the analogy drawn in 
De An. 3.5 (430al0-17) is between the agency of the agent intellect and light. What I will
argue now is that when we understand the context and purpose of this passage, it will be 
clear that it does not provide evidence against the claim that the agency of the agent 
intellect is a kind of attention.
The difficulty of interpreting the analogy between the agent intellect and light is 
understanding what is the second term of each pair: to what is it that light stands in 
relation and to what is it that the agent intellect stands in relation, such that these two 
relations are analogous? And: why does perceiving that we see and hear not stand in this 
relation? Notice this disanalogy between perceiving that we see and hear and the agent 
intellect. The agency of the agent intellect is a sufficient condition for the intelligible 
forms, once possessed by the passive intellect, to be actually thought. That is to say, it is a 
sufficient condition for the passage from the first actuality to the second actuality of 
intellection. Perceiving that we see and hear, however, is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for the sensible forms to be actually perceived: external stimulation of the sense 
organs is also required to effect the passage from the first actuality to the second actuality 
of perception. On the other hand, light is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
visibility of color. Light is the presence of something fiery in the transparent air or water 
that allows the air or water to mediate—and so be actually transparent—between the color, 
the horaton, and the sense organ, the aisthetikon of sight. See 2.7 (418a26-bl7). This, 
then, is the analogy being drawn in this passage: light is to color becoming perceptible as 
the agent intellect is to the intelligible forms, possessed by the potential intellect, 
becoming actually thought. The analogy with light is appropriate in this context.
Although, I maintain, both perceiving that we see and hear and the agency of the agent 
intellect are kinds of attention, to draw an analogy with perceiving that we see and hear in 
this context would be misleading.
241 have also argued in the endnotes that what may appear, at first blush, to provide 
evidence against the view does not disprove the interpretation. This has, I hope, made the 
view plausible.
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